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BOOK REVIEW
AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS, by Richard E. Caves. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 479. $10.00.
Since its earliest days, the air transportation industry in the United States
has been subject to regulation by the federal government. In the economic
area the regulatory agency, since 1938, has been the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its successor legisla-
tion, the Civil Aeronautics Board is directed to consider as in the public
interest, among other things, . . . "competition to the extent necessary to
assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. .. ."
Under this governmental regulation, the air transportation industry has
grown to comprise eleven trunk lines, thirteen local lines, and three heli-
copter lines as well as six all-cargo lines, twenty-nine supplemental lines
and other companies operating in Alaska, Hawaii and still others operating
between the United States and foreign destinations. The total United States
scheduled airline industry, in 1961, carried 58.4 million passengers and
produced almost forty billion passenger miles, yielding a total operating
revenue of three billion dollars. In 1951, the airlines ranked behind the
railroads and the buses in the inter-city carriage of passengers, and they
carried seventeen per cent of the traffic. By 1957, the airlines were first,
and, in 1961, the airlines' share passed fifty per cent of the total common
carrier market.
The congressional directive to foster competition has been carried out
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The individual airlines are independent
enterprises, financed by private capital, and competing with one another in
all of the markets which the Board feels can sustain competitive service.
There has emerged within the industry a pattern of economic behavior
which represents a compromise between that of the monopolistic regulated
industries on the one hand and the competitive unregulated industries on
the other. Decisions and events in the airline industry are influenced by
both the force of regulation and the forces of the market.
The Caves book is an "industry study." It deals with the United States
domestic passenger airlines in the post World War II period, and it seeks
to analyze the market structure of the industry and relate it to the con-
duct and performance of the airlines. A stated purpose of the book is to
evaluate the performance of the airlines and the regulatory authority in
terms of various general economic criteria and also in terms of the special
goals set by the Congress or the regulatory authority. It seeks also to point
to ways in which the industry's performance might be improved.
The volume is organized into four parts: the market structure of the
industry, historical analysis of the policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board,
the airlines' patterns of market performance, and the assessment of market
performance.
The author attempts, in the first part, to describe the industry in terms
of: market concentration, demand, costs, freedom of entry, and the mar-
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kets for labor, capital and equipment. In the second part, the history, de-
velopment, and evaluation of regulatory policies are presented quite briefly
but, nevertheless intelligently and perceptively.
In Part II and throughout Parts III and IV, the author tries to relate
his observations to his framework of theoretical economic analysis. For
example, he tries to speculate about what the industry's performance would
be like with varying amounts and kinds of regulation, what might be ex-
pected to happen under differing methods of subsidy rate determination,
under different policies with respect to entry of firms into the industry and
into specific city-pair markets.
At the outset, the author describes his work as seeking "... to analyze
the market structure, conduct, and performance of the United States
domestic passenger airlines, and to point out the degree of consistency and
the apparent causal relations among these elements." However, much later
in the volume (p. 378), he limits this objective, saying that: "The general
evidence on industrial organization in the American economy does not
lend much hope to any attempt to summarize the relation of an industry's
conduct to its structure." Nevertheless, in spite of this last comment, we
find the conclusion near the end of the book (p. 447) that ". . . the air
transport industry has characteristics of market structure that would
bring market performance of reasonable quality without any economic
regulation."
The book is a useful introduction to air transportation for economists
and others who desire a quick introduction to the economics and economic
history of the industry. Caves has done a workmanlike job of pulling to-
gether the output of many scholars, exhibit writers, and regulatory per-
sonnel, and of trying to view and analyze this mass of material in the
framework of economic analysis. In observing the author's treatment of
his sources, one cannot help but be amused at the spirit of local loyalty
which inspires the consistent approbation with which the author views the
works of his Cambridge colleagues; Cherington's study is "very com-
petent," United Research's report is "excellent," and Gill and Bates' work
is "an excellent source" of information. His bibliography is seventeen pages
long, but these are singled out for praise. One can only surmise about the
criteria for qualification for such adjectival commendation when, for ex-
ample, the superb (adjective mine) works of Westwood and Wheatcroft,
both of which are also cited as sources and quoted in the text, do not
qualify for equivalent treatment.
The author has been persistent in his attempt to describe and analyze
the industry in terms of his economic models, but his efforts were not uni-
formly successful. One reason for this is the sheer difficulty of the task
and the uniqueness of the air transportation industry. However, there were
other obstacles to success. One difficulty is the economic jargon itself. It
should not be necessary to say something in a complicated way, if it can
be said simply and clearly, for then the only purpose served by the complex
formulation is linguistic. There seems to be throughout the book a com-
mitment to use, wherever possible, economic jargon, and its effect is often
to obscure rather than to clarify. For example, on page 359, "If the in-
dustry were atomistic, and firms did not possess significant indivisibilities,
then the relations among city-pair fares would be like those existing in any
set of competitive markets."
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On page 369, reference is made to the fact that some airline routes
are unprofitable at the monopoly optimum fare." One may well wonder
how the author knows this, unless he has somehow determined that
the routes at issue are unprofitable at any fare, in which case, a statement
to that effect would be simpler and clearer.
After discussing the fact that, when the price-product package has many
dimensions, as is the case in air transportation, desirable changes in one
dimension may be followed by adjustments in other dimensions with the
final result being a net loss in welfare (p. 424), the author sums it up with,
"To put it very crudely, it is logically possible that, though many sellers
are preferable to one seller, one may be preferable to several."
Again on page 360, speaking of carrier petitions for fare increases, "Since
the pleas for general increases normally assume a fare increase for the in-
dustry as a whole whether or not the carriers are of one mind on the
amount of the increase, this price-calculation principle must be described
as one of joint profit maximization subject to severe constraints." One
cannot help but feel that here as well as elsewhere there is a self-conscious
attempt to find situations to which the familiar models of economics can
be applied, and that these models are referenced, as here, with no gain
other than semantics. The author sees himself as an economist and feels
free to speak for "economists," but the "economists" for whom he speaks
are vastly overdrawn. They live with and make decisions from charts and
curves and intersections involving purely economic variables. While there
are doubtless still some economists of this type, most economists today,
including the author himself, when looking at matters of public policy,
think in terms that are broader than suggested by the following quota-
tions about "economists": ". . . an economist would normally . . . prefer
to see scarce resources used to provide air transportation in various city-
pair markets up to the point where they earn merely a normal return in
each market" (p. 403; ". . . the major standing policies of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board do not coincide with the economist's usual criteria of
efficiency" (p. 433); and the concluding thought of the book (p. 479),
"There are certain goals that can be achieved by airline regulation, but
some sacrifices are necessary to achieve them. An economist may feel that
the sacrifices are hardly worth the gains, but the decision is ultimately a
political one and his role is only to inform."
In addition, the eagerness to formulate in terms of familiar economic
models can lead to hasty judgments and to such formulation in situations
which superficially might seem to fit neatly into the framework, but which
actually are not quite what they seem. A case in point is the reference on
page 443 that the adequacy-of-service case involving Fort Worth seems
"... to reflect tacit understandings by the airlines to force travelers at the
smaller of the two nearby cities to use the airport of the other." Actually,
the history of the Dallas-Fort Worth litigation on this matter goes back
to the origins of Amon Carter Field and of its substitution for Meacham
Field at which time the intention of the major airline was quite the op-
posite of that which Caves speculates. In the same category is the author's
comment that mergers (p. 442) eliminate competitors from markets where
the surviving carrier enjoys an "enormous reward" from elimination of a
competitor. Here there is failure to recognize the Board's historical posi-
tion in such matters and the additional fact that the response of other
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carriers seeking entry and of various civic intervenors would, if the Board
did not act spontaneously, be immediate and forceful. Also, on page 319,
"Some carriers favor high utilization (as much as twelve hours a day)
with the resulting higher maintenance costs; others seem to minimize
maintenance costs at the expense of lower utilization per day." The impli-
cation that some carriers favor low utilization is novel, to say the least.
He notes on page 303 that the "... market conduct of the domestic
airlines must be outlined in rather an odd way because of a technological
difference in conduct between airlines and most other industries. A tooth-
paste buyer is utterly unconcerned with the nature and appearance of the
capital goods which produce his dentifrice. The air traveler bases his choice
among airlines on the nature of the capital goods producing the service
more than on anything else." The distinction here is not nearly so sharp
as this suggests. The toothpaste buyer may not care about the factory in
which the dentifrice is made, but he cares much about the store in which
he buys it. Indeed for all retail stores and services, for banks, hairdressers,
dentists and any businesses in which the customer visits the premises or
comes in contact with the equipment of the seller, the nature and con-
dition of the capital goods of the seller are a factor in the customer's de-
cision. In this sense, the airlines are hardly unique!
On page 427, it is noted that the advertising expenditures of the air-
lines, as a percentage of revenues tend to be relatively uniform among
carriers with the exception that airlines with resort traffic seem to spend
relatively more on promotion. However, the author fails to explain that
there is good reason for this in that these resort serving airlines are trying
to create travel by attracting tourists to these resorts and that they are
not merely seeking to be the carrier selected for travel which would other-
wise be provided by other airlines or by other modes of transportation.
The expenditure is bigger because the job to be done is bigger and because
the stakes are bigger.
One of the most discussed aspects of airline regulation is that of entry
of new firms into the industry and of entry of firms, either new or exist-
ing, into routes which they have not been serving. This volume does not
neglect this area. However, the uninitiated reader may be somewhat con-
fused about the tightness of the control over entry. On pages 428-9, entry
is easy: "On the other hand, cost conditions facilitate exit from a particular
city-pair. This plus the ease of entry by an established carrier, makes
competition workable in these markets despite the necessarily high seller
concentration ... over the history of the Board, entrenched carriers have
seldom been free from the fear that a route case would unleash new
competition. .. ." But, on page 430, "The control of entry and exit, both
in the national market and in city-pair markets, has raised the cost of air
transportation through protecting inefficient firms. . . ." And on page 442,
"... with blockaded entry a carrier enjoys an enormous reward from
seizing any opportunity to eliminate a carrier." Thus, we have it both ways.
On page 213, it is emphasized that the Board has been dominated, in
its route awards, by its desire to strengthen the weaker carriers and ". . . to
equalize the relative profitability and absolute size of the trunks." On this
and the following page, the author emphasized the dogged determination
with which the Board has pursued this objective. Yet, on page 322, in dis-
cussing the capital markets, he concludes that, "In sum, the structural
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traits of the capital market, combined with the Civil Aeronautics Board
failure to come very close to equalizing the relative profitability of the
large and small carriers, appear as critical elements in determining an in-
crease in seller concentration in the airlines and possibly a decrease in the
workability of competition."
It is indeed the case that the Board has tried very hard to strengthen the
weaker carriers, and it is also true that there is still great variation among
the carriers with respect to size and profitability. However, it is less than
fair to the Board and its history to speak of the "failure" of the Board to
equalize and to assign that as a cause of the "decrease" in the workability
of competition; decrease from what? It makes a big difference whether
reference is to decrease from what it was, from what it realistically might
have been, or from the economist's ideal. The Board is fairly subject to
much criticism, and Caves in this volume has added his share, but this is
not an area in which the Board has been remiss.
Another attack on the Board's procedures was that they "... are gen-
erally aimed at giving a fair hearing to all carrier parties, and the Board
has not faced the fact that this often makes impossible any firm or con-
sistent pursuit of the public interest" (p. 442). The author does not ex-
plain why this follows, and, although one cannot disagree that the re-
quirements of due process may limit the efficiency of the regulatory process,
the argument that pursuit of the public interest is thereby made impos-
sible is not convincing.
He concludes, on page 431, that "... the Board's policies, on the whole,
have probably had little effect on the rate of profit earned by the in-
dustry." This presumably means, that it is not different from what it
would be without regulation. If so, this comment is at variance with the
statement on the same page that mergers ". . . would result in an in-
crease in profit rates earned by the carriers." Certainly, if that is the case,
the Board's policies will affect profit rates. Indeed, the previous reference
to his statement that a carrier can reap huge rewards as a consequence of
the "blockaded entry" suggests again that the Board's policies are not
without effect on carriers' profit rates.
On page 441, Caves takes the Air Coordinating Committee to task for
saying that "the greater strength resulting from merged operations would
actually increase the keenness of competition within the industry."1 Caves
argues that this is refuted by all sorts of evidence which he does not present,
and, he caps his argument with, "And if this were not enough, the logic
of the quotation implies that reducing the number of firms in an industry
renders it more and more competitive until, with only two left, competi-
tion reaches its maximum effectiveness; no comment seems necessary."
Actually, I am afraid that some comment is necessary. The author, at the
end of his long study of the air transportation industry has lost sight of
the critical characteristic of that industry that the market for air trans-
portation and the locus of competition in air transportation is the in-
dividual city-pair. The Air Coordination Committee's statement merely
suggests that, for example, Northeast could have offered keener competi-
tion to Eastern and National on the New York-Florida route if Northeast
had merged with, say, TWA or Delta; an idea which hardly merits such
ridicule.
' Civil Air Policy, 1954, p. 12.
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The volume is written primarily for the economist, and it assumes that
the reader is familiar with economic models and with many economic and
political aspects of public regulation. Chapter XII on the political environ-
ment is a sophisticated and well written analysis of the history and in-
fluence of political pressures on Civil Aeronautics Board policies and de-
cisions. In it and elsewhere the author shows himself to be courageous in
taking strong positions on controversial matters. While one might not agree
with all of his conclusions, one cannot help but be impressed with his
forthrightness.
He recommends, following United Research, that the trunks be shifted
out of marginally profitable points, that direct subsidy be continued for
the local service carriers, and that the Board drop all policies toward the
trunks that are used solely to protect internal subsidy. However, his basic
position is that ". . . the air transport industry has characteristics of market
structure that would bring market performance of reasonable quality
without any economic regulation." Further, he feels that now is the time
and opportunity to phase out economic regulation of the airlines, and he
presents a step-by-step procedure for this phasing-out process, at the end
of which, the "... . remaining role of the Civil Aeronautics Board would be
strictly promotional" (p. 448). Samuel B. Richmond*
* Professor of Economics and Statistics, School of Business, Columbia University. Author of
Regulation and Competition in Air Transportation (1961).
